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and the professionalism of five major international non-governmental organizations (NGOs). These specialized in humanitarian clearance in general and, more
specifically, in the problem of CBUs.
Among these NGOs was the Inrersos
Mine Action Unit, a unique Italian NGO
that, besides a humanitarian relief project,
has conducted humanitarian mine and
UXO clearance as well as mine risk education projects since 1997.
International actors spent rwo years
clearing CBUs from Kosovo. Nowadays,
rhe final work is carried out by the Kosovo
Protection Civil Agency, with local experts trained at the beginning by rhe international technical expe rts of the
Imersos Mine Action Unit and other international NGOs.

CBUs in Other Countries
The threat of CBUs in the Balkans
is nor only a problem in Kosovo. In the
Republic of Serbia, for example, UXO
remain everywhere-even in public gardens-as the Imersos Mine Action Unit's
experts pointed our in June 2001 after
an accurate assessmem of the territory ro
define rhe magnitude of rhe problem.
In Afghanistan, we found a dud rare
as high as 50 percent in some case. Ir is
to be mentioned that, prior to the Coalition Forces Military Campaign, barrie
area clearance (BAC) operations in Afghanistan were mainly conducted by surface clearing. The widespread use of
CBUs during the air campaign and the

lethality of cluster submunitions have
forced the Mine Action Centre for Afghanistan (MACA) ro adopt stricter Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) similar to the ones adopted by the UN Mine
Acrion Centres in Kosovo and BosniaHerzegovina (BiH), where the depth of
clearance for CBUs is set at 500 mm.
Thus, it was necessary ro train BAC teams
on the use of the Schonsted metal detector, a new instrument specifically designed for detecting ferrous materials to
a depth of 500 mm. Intersos provided
approximately 60 Schonsted detectors ro
the Afghan NGO partner and trained
three BAC teams to use them properly
and efficiently.
The follow ing are two main examples of CBU data collected:
l. Kabul Province, Karoti Village:
363,500 sq m infested by mines (agricultural and grazing ground). Dispensers dropped: 4. Total cluster bombs
dropped (BL-97): 800. Wirh 80 percent
of rhe area cleared, we found 484
unexploded BL-97s (60 percent of the
rotal).
2. Kabul Province, Mosazajee Village: 248,000 sq m infested by mines
(agricultural and grazing grou nd). Dispensers dropped: 6. Total c l uster
bombs dropped (BL-97) : l ,200. With
90 percent of the area cleared, we
found 513 unexploded BL-97s (43
percent of rhe total).

CBUsandthe
International Community

reason, they were not restricted by the Ottawa Treaty. Cluster bombs, which continue robe used, pollute the environment
and are a serious threat for civilians. They
represent a real limitation ro rhe economic development of states and a serious economic burden for rhe international community.
In fact, a matter of primary importance is to conduct humanitarian clearance of these affected rerrirories, which
means areas need ro be 99.6 percent clear,
as international standards dictate. This
kind of percentage involves great costs
and long term funds from the international community, but gives back a lot in
terms of saving human lives.
Therefore, we believe that the international community should pay much
more attention ro every country affected
by CBUs, as a global and humanitarian
justice. And mostly, we believe that the
international community shou ld address
much more attention to the issue of possible funher use of CBUs in upcoming
conflicts, as in Iraq. •

*All graphics courtesy ofthe author.
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Overall, CBUs are not considered
similar in the effects to APLs. For this

The U.S. Humanitarian Mine
Action Program in Iraq
The United States government has developed a wide-ranging plan
to build an indigenous mine action capability within Iraq. The plan
will help rid Iraq of the threat of landmines and UXO so that the
country can focus on rebuilding it's society.

by t he United States
Humanitarian Mine Action
Program
Imagine growing up in a coLmtry where
you had to live with the sounds of gunfire
and the glow of missiles keeping you awake
at night. Imagine the overwhelming feeling
of joy when these terrors ended. Imagine
wanting to run freely among your friends,
but not being able to, because of the
dangerous objects that lay around your
neighborhood long after the war is over.
Iraq is such a country that now, more then
ever, needs an organized, well-developed
program to remove these threatening objects.
In order to help provide d1is humanitarian
assistance, the United States government has
developed a robust and wide-ranging
plan to build an indigenous mine action
capability within the country. The plan
will help rid Iraq of the threat of
landmines and UXO. With the help of
the United States, the United Nations and
other countries around the world, Iraq will
be able to foresee the end of it's landmine
problem and focus on rebuilding
it's society.

observe rs consider that landmines
present a clear risk in Iraq, but a more
significant threat is posed by UXO. T he
International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC) reported in 2001 that UXO
from previous conflicts have constituted
the major humanitarian threat for the
past several years in northern Iraq, along the
border with Iran, as well as a throughout
central and southern Iraq. The problem is
now exacerbated by the widespread
presence of abandoned munitions and
unexploded remnants from the most
recent conflict.
With the cessation of hostilities,
United States Cenrral Command

The LandminefUXO Problem
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CBUs dropped

cleared

unexploded CBUs

Karoti

363,500

800

80

484 (60 percent)

Mosazajee

248,200

1,200

90

513 (43 percent)

• F1gure 1. Examples of CBU data collected.
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Iraq has been the victim of violent
conflict throughout its hisrory, which, in
recent years, has left the land plagued with
landmines and UXO, disrupting the social,
economic and environmental development
of the country. Before Operation Iraqi
Freedom (OIF), an estimated 10-1 5
mi llion landmines we re deployed in
Iraq, dating from conflicts as far back
as World War II, with the majority of
the landmines laid during the Iran/Iraq
War from 1980 to 1988. International
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(USCENTCOM) set up procedures to
identifY minefield locations throughout
Iraq. Over 2,500 minefields, 2,200 UXO/
sub-munitions locations and thousands of
abandoned munitions sites have been
identified, and more are found on a daily
basis. USCENTCOM has also established
mechanisms to transfer information to
non-governmental organizations (NGOs)
about the minefield and U:X:O locations
as part of the effort to clear the land of
these silent threats.
Prior to OIF, the landmine/UXO
problem was we ll-documented in
nonhern Iraq only, thanks to a survey conducted by the United Nations. It was in
the north that the only substantial mine
action efforts took place, consisting of
landmine/UXO clearance and mine risk
education (MRE). The Iraqi government,
however, rook a dim view of mine action
in the north, attempting to bring such
practices to a halt. According to the

• EOO stockpi les.

Department of State's (DOS) 1999
Counrry Reports on Human Rights
Practices, the Iraqi government declared
demining subversive, claiming that such
activity violated Security Council resolutions on the need to respect Iraq's
territorial integrity and sovereignty.
Iraqi officials ordered workers performing
demining activities to leave Iraq, and
denied visas to mine action personnel
crying co enter the country. The United
Nations and many NGOs ignored the
order and continued their dangerous work.
Before the current conflict, mine
contamination was esti mated to affect
over 1,000 communities, with reported
accidents caused by mines/UXO occurring
at an average rate of 31 per month. Since
March 20, 2003, the number of casualties
has increased significandy. According to
Mines Advisory Group (MAG) there have
been over 400 casualties in the northern
governorates alone.
Much less is known abour the
landmine problem in the south and
central regions of Iraq. Borders with
Iran are heavily mined, and the locations
of the minefields are generally known.
Beyond that, there were reports oflraqis
laying mines prior to the most recent
conflict, but there is little evidence to
suggest that this was widespread. Media
reports suggest extensive artillery and aerial
bombardment has contributed to the
a lready significant UXO problem
throughout the councry, particularly in
the central region.
The IC RC has carried our MRE
programs in 14 governorates and trained
20 Iraqi volunteers in Baghdad. The World
Food Program began distributing MRE
information with all food deliveries
beginning June 1, 2003. These efforts
are also suppo rted by other MRE
efforts from various NGOs, the United
Nations and the Coalition Information
Operations, which includes messages
concerning MRE.

United States Assistance
The United States began mine action
assistance to Iraq in 2002, through
separate grants to the Mines Advisory
Group (MAG) and the Norwegian
Peoples Aid (NPA). The grants, totaling

$2, 160,138, were awarded by the State
Department's Bureau of Near Eastern
Affairs to support clearance efforts in the
northern governorates.
Currently, the United States
government is implementing a robust
three-year plan co reduce the threat of
landmines/UXO in Iraq after OIF. The
Iraqi Relief Supplemental, enacted by
Congress in April 2003, provides funding
for this project. The plan includes the
following initiatives: MRE, the Quick
Reaction Demining Force (QRDF),
building capacities for mine action
coordination and demining operations
and expanding existing mine/UXO
clearance capacities.

Mine Risk Education
The United States is developing a
substantial MRE program throughout
Iraq with MAG as the implementing
partner. As envisioned, MAG has positioned
ten MRE teams in various regions of
Iraq. These teams will work with
community-based organizations and
m edia to deliv e r MRE messages
throughout the country.
The DOS, in conjunction with
UNICEF, has procured MRE materials
for use by NGOs conducting MRE
programs ar locations with populations
that are highly at risk due to UXO/
landmines. The materials consis t of
MRE boards, flyers and posters, and
have been distributed in Basra and
~aghdad as of June 2003.

The Quick Reaction Demining
Force (QRDF)
The QRDF deployed from as
home base, Mozambique, on May 2,
2003, to work on high priority demining
operations in Iraq. The force is split into
four teams eac h consisting of six
deminers, one medic, one t ea m
leader, two dog handlers and two
mine detection dogs (MODs). The
deployment is anticipated to last
app roximately four months, and is
being implemented b y RONCO
Consul t ing Corporation, the State
Department's d emining contractor.
Actual clearance operations began
on May 8, 2003, in the regions of AI
Hilla and Baghdad. Over 3,700 sq m
in two minefields have been cleared, as
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well as over 716,770 sq m of UXOinfested land. The QRDF has also
completed building the first field
explosives storage bunker constructed
by a civilian organization in Iraq.

Mine Action Coordination
To build an indigenous capacity
for the management and coo rdinati on
of mine action, the Department of
State will support the establishment
and developmenr of the Iraq National
Mine Action Authority (INMAA) and
an Iraq National Mine Action Center
(INMAC). DOS will recruit, train and
equip local perso nnel to assume these
responsibilities. DOS and Department
of Defense (DOD) have deployed
mine action experts to advise the
Coalition Provisional Authority
(CPA), as well as lo cal and national
authorities, on matters relevant to the
establishmenr of this capacity and to
liaise with USCENTCOM, the United
Nations, NGOs and other organizations,
as appropriate.

Expanding Existing Capacity
The DOS will take advantage of
the existing mine action capacity in
Iraq , which will cut back on th e
amount of necessary training and
equipp ing. The plan incorporates four
MAG demining teams, each consisting of 22 deminers, to support mine
clearance requirements outside of
northern Iraq. All mine clearance tasks
and plans will be in accordance with
priority tasks from the INMAA.

Demining Operations Capacity
Building
The State Department plans to task
RONCO Consulting Corporation to train
and equip demining teams augmented by
MODs. RONCO will retain operational
management responsibilities for these
teams, provide technical advice and
management training, and eventually transfer all assets and comrol to the successor
government's mine action aurhori ty.
Building a mine/UXO clearing
capability into the requirements fo r
the New Iraqi Corps is also under
consideration, as is the development
of a civilian demining corps. Demining
effo rts will continue long after Coalition

I Building a mine action capability within the nation of Iraq is a future goal.

Forces are redeployed and will take a
concerted effort by the United States and
the international commu nity to
bu ild mine action capability within
the nation of Iraq.

M ine Action Authority
The present lack of an indigenous
mine clearing capab ility does nor
preclude an operational capability now.
The Coali tion Provisional Authority
(CPA) is acknowledged as the relevant
authority in Iraq with respect to mine action.
USCENTCOM has established a Mine
Exp losive Ordnance Coordination
Center to provide data interface between
the military clearing and the United
Nations and NGO demining efforts.
CPA has established an Emergency Mine
Action Team (EMAT) staffed by representatives from the Departments of State
and Defense to satisfy the Coalition Force
Commander's objectives and establish

mine action policy and to coordinate mine
action projects throughout the country.
EMAT will work closely with the mine
action service providers and the United
Nations mine action infrastructure. T he
plan envisions transitioning responsibil ities
as the relevant authority for mine action
to an Iraq National Mine Action
Authority as soon as possible.

Conclusion
Even though the Iraq Mine Action
Plan was just initiated and implemented in
recent months, there have been many noreworrhy accomplishments. Once all programs bcome fully operational, the people
oflraq can look forward to a day when they
will be able to walk the earth in safety. 1

*All images courtesy ofthe author.
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